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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Donald De La Haye, a Division I football player for
the University of Central Florida of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”), was deemed ineligible for NCAA
participation due to his successful YouTube channel,
“Deestroying.”1 De La Haye was a kicker for the University of
Central Florida’s (“UCF”) football team.2 At the time, his YouTube
channel had over 90,000 subscribers and almost 5,000,000 views.3
The NCAA found De La Haye ineligible because he was
compensated for videos that included aspects of his life as an
NCAA athlete—a violation of the NCAA bylaws.4
The consequences of this decision were life changing for De La
Haye and went well beyond losing football. As De La Haye
explained, “no more college football[,] since I can’t play college
football[,] no more scholarship[,] I’m ineligible[,] I can’t pay for
school.”5 De La Haye had created content for his YouTube channel
before he was UCF’s kicker. However, as soon as he became a
NCAA athlete, his compliance officer explained that he could no
longer be compensated for the use of his own name, image, and
†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2022, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2015, University of Mary Washington. I would
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Note.
1
Dan Gartland, UCF Kicker Ruled Ineligible After YouTube Channel Gets Him in
Trouble with NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2017), https://www.si.com/college/
2017/07/31/ucf-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-ineligible-ncaa-youtube-videos
[https://perma.cc/FJ6J-6TCP].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020-2021 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Const. art. 12.4.4 (2021), available at https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport
/90008 (“A student-athlete may establish his or her own business, provided the
student-athlete’s name, photograph, appearance or athletics reputation is [sic] not
used to promote the business.”).
5
Deestroying, I Lost My Full D1 Scholarship Because of My YouTube Channel,
YOUTUBE (July 31, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fh69-X6X55w&feature=
emb_logo [https://perma.cc/U53A-88CA].

521

522

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:521

likeness (“NIL”).6 De La Haye is a prime example of the NCAA’s
ability to control players’ lives through the simultaneous
exploitation and restriction of their publicity rights.7
The right of publicity is defined as “the right of a person to
control the commercial use of [their] identity.”8 While this right
developed in privacy law, the right of publicity soon diverged from
the right of privacy.9 The fracturing of the right of publicity from
the right of privacy arose because, although the right of privacy
was adequately protecting individuals, companies wanted more
control over their economic interests in public personalities.10
Most importantly, the right of publicity—unlike the right of
privacy—is treated as a form of freely alienable property.11
This Note critiques the intent behind the development of a
transferable right of publicity and argues that the present-day
realities of an alienable right of publicity, particularly in relation
to NCAA athletes, is problematic. Part I of this Note addresses
the background of the right of publicity. Specifically, it explains
how the right of publicity grew out of the right of privacy for the
purpose of benefiting the publicity-holder, not protecting the
identity-holder.12 Part II examines how the NCAA, through its
amateurism rules, requires student-athletes to do the equivalent
of a transfer of their right of publicity. This Part demonstrates
how the NCAA bylaws result in rampant abuse of young college
athletes’ publicity rights.13 Part III demonstrates how the
solutions that the courts, the NCAA, and state and federal
legislatures have proposed up to this point have been insufficient.
Finally, Part IV explores possible solutions to the issue of
alienability of the right of publicity, including the creation of a
federal right of publicity.

6

Id.
See infra Section II.B.
8
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed. 2020).
9
Id.
10
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD 75 (2018).
11
See MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 8, § 1:7.
12
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 75.
13
See Cal. Educ. Code § 67456 (West 2021) (California Fair Pay to Play Act is
operative January 1, 2023 with the purpose of allowing NCAA Athletes to exploit their
publicity rights without losing their NCAA eligibility).
7
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I. A FLAWED FOUNDATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A.

The Origins of the Right of Publicity

The modern right of publicity is commonly described as a right
that was created in the 1950s, however the right of publicity can
be seen in privacy cases as early as the 1800s.14 For example, in
1895, the New York Court of Appeals was the first high court to
consider whether a right of privacy existed.15 Interestingly, the
dispute arose from an objection to the unauthorized use of the
name and likeness of Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler—a famous,
deceased, society woman.16 The court in Schuyler v. Curtis held
that if Mrs. Hamilton did have a right to privacy, it would be
personal to her and it would not survive her death.17 In fact, many
of the first cases to consider whether a right of privacy existed
were cases involving the nonconsensual use of an individual’s
image and likeness for commercial gain.18
A few years later, in 1902, the same court analyzed the
privacy right question in the context of a living objector.19 In
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., the court held that Abigail
Roberson, a teenager who had her portrait taken at a local photo
studio, had no right of privacy when Franklin Mills Flour company
utilized a portrait of her on a product advertisement without her
permission.20 Public uproar about the decision led to corrective
legislation because less than one year after the Roberson decision,
the governor of New York signed into law the “Act to Prevent the
Unauthorized Use of the Name or Picture of Any Person for the
Purposes of Trade.”21
B.

The Shift to a Separate Right of Publicity

Although the right of privacy was implicated in cases
involving the nonconsensual use of images, there was a shift to a
new concept, the right of publicity. About fifty years after
Roberson, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 8, § 1:4; ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 11.
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 442 (2d Cir. 1895).
Id.
Id. at 447.
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 11.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1902).
Id. at 556.
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 2021).
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“right of publicity” in its 1953 opinion Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.22 The Haelan court considered two
parties’ competing claims that they owned exclusive rights to use
baseball players’ photographs to help sell gum.23 The defendant
contended that the baseball players only had a privacy interest in
their pictures.24 The Second Circuit in Haelan rejected the
defendant’s argument and held that “in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy . . . , a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph.”25 The opinion also stated that
this “right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing” a person’s
likeness may be validly done “in gross” without any related
transfer of an underlying business.26 In distinguishing the right
of publicity from the traditional right of privacy, the court in
Haelan reasoned that this right of publicity was crucial to protect
public figures’ ability to profit off their own identities.27 The
problem with this line of reasoning, however, is that in Haelan,
the lawsuit primarily protected the commercial interests that both
businesses had in the baseball players’ identity but not the
baseball players’ interests directly.28
C.

The Intent Behind the Right of Publicity

The court in Haelan claimed that individuals have a right of
publicity separate from the right of privacy because public figures
need a way to control and harness the profitability of their image,
name, and likeness.29 The perception that public figures lost their
privacy rights by entering the public scene and needed another
tool to protect themselves was incorrectly based on case law that
seemed to suggest public figures waived their rights of privacy by
virtue of being public figures.30
For example, in the earlier O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. case, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not hold that David O’Brien—a

22

202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (introducing the term).
Id. at 867.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 868.
26
Id.
27
Id. (arguing that New York cases have recognized such a right).
28
Id. at 867.
29
Id. at 868.
30
See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 30; see also Talor Bearman, Intercepting
Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a Federal Right of Publicity, 15 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 92 (2012) (arguing that public figures need an avenue to protect
their commercial rights in their image and name).
23
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highly recognizable top collegiate football player—had lost his
privacy rights because he was a well-known football player.31
Instead, the court held that the specific photograph used by Pabst
Sales Company, a popular beer distributor, was one that O’Brien
had consented to be used for team publicity.32 Regardless of the
case’s actual holding, Pabst’s lawyer stated that the “football star
[O’Brien’s] likeness has become the possession of the public,” and
that quote was unfortunately and frequently cited to support the
idea that public figures lose their privacy rights.33
This pervasive yet incorrect idea that Haelan created the right
of publicity for the benefit of public figures who had lost their
privacy rights is ironic upon a closer examination of the Haelan
case. In Haelan, as mentioned above, two competing gum
manufactures were fighting over the control of baseball players’
names and pictures used in trading cards.34 Neither the individual
baseball players, nor their interests, were ever represented during
the litigation.35
The history of the right of privacy demonstrates that it
sufficiently protected public figures.36
However, businesses
utilizing public identities sought a way to ensure that they could
exclusively exploit an identity-holder’s name and likeness.37 The
right of privacy, which historically governed these disputes, was
viewed as a personal right and therefore not alienable.38 Thus,
businesses had no way to prevent the individual from extending
their name, image, and likeness to multiple companies.39
31

124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941).
Id.
33
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 43.
34
Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953);
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 45.
35
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867; ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 46; Jennifer E.
Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 194 (2012).
36
Rothman, supra note 35, at 194, 198 (arguing that an identity-holder could have
endorsed a product or given permission for the use of their image and be compensated
for doing so without assigning the right to his identity to another person or entity
which demonstrates that the baseball players were adequately protected and
compensated for the use of their image prior to the existence of an assignable right of
publicity).
37
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867; Rothman, supra note 35, at 193, 198 (explaining
that Haelan sued Topps specifically because they believed they were granted exclusive
use of the baseball player’s name and likeness and wanted to prevent Topps’ continued
use of it).
38
Rothman, supra note 35, at 208.
39
Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 (explaining a public personality would earn no
money for their name, image, or likeness unless it could be made the subject of an
exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures).
32
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Hollywood reinforced the development of a separate right of
publicity.40 The movie industry relied on long-term contracts to
lock actors into specific studios, which gave the studio ultimate
control in cultivating and regulating the actors’ public image,
persona, career, and personal life choices.41 However, in 1944
actress Olivia de Haviland officially ended these long-term
employment contracts when she sued Warner Brothers to
invalidate her contract as a violation of California’s Labor Code.42
After the De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. decision,
Hollywood studios looked for new ways to manage the public
image surrounding their actors.43 Zealous advocates in the movie
industry, like Paramount Pictures attorney Melville Nimmer,
pushed for an independent and alienable right of publicity.44
Nimmer stated that a new right was needed because the “concept
of privacy” did not meet the needs of Broadway and Hollywood.45
Nimmer designed this new right to provide the “entertainment
and allied industries” with the ability to once again control their
“employees’ names and portraits.”46 However, nowhere did
Nimmer express concern for the effect that this new right would
have on the identity-holders themselves.47 The creation of a
separate transferable right of publicly was never about protecting
the identity-holder.48 Instead, it was about providing industries
with a disturbing amount of control over another human’s identity
and life choices for commercial gain.49

40
See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE 143–207 (1991) (discussing the
historical developments and the chronology of events leading up to the adoption of the
right of publicity, including the changes in Hollywood).
41
David Denby, Fallen Idols: Have Stars Lost Their Magic?, THE NEW YORKER
(Oct.
22,
2007),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/10/22/fallen-idols
[https://perma.cc/F6CA-W3HM].
42
De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 986–87 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1944) (limiting an employment contract with a studio to seven years and
striking down the longstanding practice that studios had used to extend seven-year
contracts far beyond that term).
43
ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 69.
44
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
204, 212, 222 (1954) (arguing for the adoption of an independent and transferable
right of publicity).
45
Id. at 203–04.
46
Id. at 204.
47
Id. at 212; ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 69.
48
Rothman, supra note 35, at 187.
49
See GAINES, supra note 40, at 143–207 (describing the chronology of events
leading up to the adoption of the right of publicity).
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D. The Current Right of Publicity
Today, the right of publicity is a state managed issue with no
controlling federal legislation.50 The lack of a federal right of
publicity has created large discrepancies on how and when an
individual’s publicity rights will be protected.51 For example, some
states do not recognize the right of publicity at all.52 Even in states
that do recognize a right of publicity, the scope of protection varies
widely.53 Some states provide right of publicity protections to any
individual, whereas other states limit the right only to individuals
with valuable personalities, such as celebrities or other public
figures.54 Additionally, some states extend the right of publicity to
deceased individuals, but others have limited the right only to the
living.55 The lack of uniformity across states is especially
problematic for national organizations, like the NCAA, with
members located in all fifty states.56
Crucially, because the right of publicity is treated as a
property right, it is freely assignable.57 Therefore, the publicityholder—the person who owns the right of publicity—does not have
to be the same person as the identity-holder—the individual whose
identity is being used.58 The ability to transfer an individual’s
interests and rights in their own identity is a powerful tool for

50

ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 2; see infra Section III.E (explaining how the
Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, is inapplicable to cover the right of
publicity).
51
Brittany A. Adkins, Crying Out for Uniformity: Eliminating State
Inconsistencies in Right of Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity
Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 499, 500–02 (2010).
52
MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 8, § 6:2; see also Jennifer E. Rothman,
ROADMAP
TO
THE
RIGHT
OF
PUBLICITY,
The
Law,
ROTHMAN’S
https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/law [https://perma.cc/F4GM-5FY9] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021) (listing and describing every state’s right of publicity).
53
See Bearman, supra note 30, at 96 (“The right of publicity [is] . . . a piecemeal
compilation of state statutes and common law or is wholly unrecognized.”).
54
See Rothman, supra note 52.
55
See S. S05959D, 2019-2020, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (expanding the New York
right of publicity to protect the right of publicity for the deceased, whose publicity
rights have commercial value at the time of their death or because of their death); see
also Rothman, supra note 52 (illustrating that Wyoming currently does not recognize
a right of publicity that extends to the deceased).
56
What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/3FJZ-GRFR] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021)
(describing the NCAA as a national organization with members in all fifty states).
57
MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 8, § 10:13; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“The interest in the commercial value
of a person’s identity . . . is freely assignable to others.”).
58
Rothman, supra note 35, at 187.
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publicity-holders, but it can be a dangerous liability for identityholders.59 It is particularly hazardous when the identity-holder’s
interests differ from the publicity-holder’s interests. The public
and, more troublingly, the courts have often assumed that the
publicity-holder’s and the identity-holder’s interests, values, and
goals are aligned, but unfortunately this is often not true.60
Courts have limited the alienability of publicity rights to only
voluntary assignments to avoid significant loss of control over
one’s identity.61 Unfortunately, this limitation does not prevent all
of the abuses that arise when the right of publicity is freely
alienable.62 For example, oftentimes, the identity-holder has little
bargaining power when deciding whether to transfer their right of
publicity or not, raising the possibility that what appears to be a
“voluntary” assignment may not be such.63 A clear example of this
arises in the relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes.
II. WHERE PUBLICITY RIGHTS FAIL – NCAA ATHLETE CASE
STUDY
A.

NCCA Amateurism Model

To fully grasp how the current right of publicity underserves
NCAA athletes, a bit of context is necessary. The NCAA is a
member-led organization where colleges, universities, and athletic
conferences are the NCAA members.64 They establish and enforce
rules and regulations relating to college sporting activities for its
member-universities.65 The NCAA’s core values are advertised as
providing a quality educational experience and a competitive
balance for their student-athletes and organization members.66
Furthermore, the NCAA promotes a culture of amateurism where
the athlete is a student first—thus the famous title “student59

Id.
Id.
61
Id. at 189 (discussing how to facilitate the collection of an unpaid judgment, the
estate of Ronald Goldman filed a motion seeking the assignment and transfer of O.J.
Simpson’s right of publicity).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 198.
64
Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa [https://perma.cc/F8QK-9KPR] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021).
65
Id.
66
See Mission Statement and Bylaws, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default
/files/M_WinonaState_SAACBylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/D33B-TRMM] (last visited
Sept. 16, 2021).
60
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athlete.”67 To uphold these organizational initiatives, the NCAA
uses extensive bylaws, policing, and punishment to maintain the
idea of amateurism.68 These regulations ensure that studentathletes do not use their athletic abilities nor their position as
NCAA athletes to receive compensation.69
Although the
underlying purpose of these bylaws is to promote and maintain the
NCAA’s values, they amount to a broad transfer of the studentathletes' publicity rights.
B.

The NCAA Bylaws are Equivalent to a Transfer of Publicity
Rights

If a prospective student-athlete (“PSA”) wants to participate
in collegiate athletics, they must sign a contract granting the
rights to use their name or picture to the NCAA, the specific
university, and their university’s conference.70 This requirement
allows the NCAA, the university, and the conference to use the
student-athlete’s name, image, and likeness in promotional
materials, live streaming of games, and selling of merchandise.71
However, in addition to requiring that student-athletes waive
their right of publicity, the NCAA bylaws also place suffocating
restrictions on the student-athletes’ ability to commercialize their
own identities.72 The bylaws make student-athletes ineligible if
they commercialize their identity as a student-athlete in any way.
For example, NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1, “Advertisements and
Promotions After Becoming a Student-Athlete,” states that a
student-athlete becomes ineligible to remain a NCAA studentathlete if they:
(a) [a]ccept[ ] any remuneration for or permit[ ] the use of his or
her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly
the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind; or
(b) [r]eceive[ ] remuneration for endorsing a commercial product
67

Kevin Given, Walter Byers: The Man Who Built the NCAA, Then Tried to Tear
It Down, WBUR (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2017/10/13/walterbyers-ncaa [https://perma.cc/4BPN-SNTY].
68
Enforcement Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/
enforcement-process-penalties [https://perma.cc/J2SC-DB5P] (last visited Sept. 16,
2021).
69
See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4, Bylaw 12.11, at 93–94
(stating that student athletes become ineligible if they use their athletic skills or
position as an NCAA athlete to gain compensation).
70
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4, Bylaw 12.5.1.1, at 75.
71
See generally NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4, Bylaw 12.5, at
74–78.
72
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4, Bylaw 12.5.2, at 77–78.
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or service through the individual’s use of such product or
service.73

Therefore, the student-athlete technically does not transfer
their right of publicity but, in fact, retains their right of publicity.74
However, in reality, the NCAA, the university, and the conference
all have the ability to exploit the student-athletes’ name, image,
and likeness for commercial gain while simultaneously restricting
the student-athletes’ use of their identity. Ultimately, the NCAA
bylaws equate to a transfer of the student-athletes’ publicity
rights.
The NCAA amateurism model has been viewed as a mutually
beneficial relationship.75 The rationale behind this concept is
rooted in an underlying contractual relationship where the
student-athlete agrees that the NCAA and the university can use
the student-athlete’s image for their benefit in exchange for the
university’s pledge to provide a substantially discounted
opportunity to attend college.76 However, over time college
athletics has expanded into a multi-billion dollar industry and,
accordingly, student-athletes and the general public have begun
to question if this is still a mutually beneficial relationship.77
C.

NCAA Revenue Depends on the Exploitation of StudentAthlete Publicity Rights

The severe exploitation of NCAA student-athletes is
reinforced by NCAA bylaws that allow the NCAA to freely utilize
the student-athletes’ publicity rights while at the same time
completely restricting student-athletes from each using their own
right of publicity. In 2019, NCAA schools across all three divisions
and all athletic departments reported $18.9 billion in total

73

NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 4, Bylaw 12.5.2.1, at 77.
See Bearman, supra note 30, at 105.
75
Eric J. Sobocinski, College Athletes: What Is Fair Compensation?, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS. L.J. 257, 272 (1996) (“ ‘[Y]ou’re putting stuff on the athletes and making
money off of it, but they’re getting an education here.’ ”) (quoting Mark Brantley,
director of corporate relations at the University of Southern California).
76
See Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining A University’s
Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 748 (1991)
(asserting that universities owe a duty to educate student-athletes based on contract
theory); John Keilman & Jared S. Hopkins, College Athletes Routinely Sign Away
Rights to Be Paid for Names, Images, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 26, 2015, 8:23 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-ncaa-waivers-met-20150326story.html [https://perma.cc/FAH7-TUSZ].
77
See Davis supra note 76, at 748–54.
74
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revenue.78 The largest source of revenue for the NCAA is the
Division I Men’s Basketball Championship television and
marketing rights, earning $821.4 million.79 This revenue is, in
turn, dependent upon the exploitation of student-athletes’
publicity rights.80
This revenue is distributed in more than a dozen ways,
including many ways that support NCAA schools.81
Approximately $3.6 billion dollars of the NCAA’s annual revenues
are allocated to providing 180,000 athletic scholarships.82 Yet, the
vast majority of the remaining revenue does not directly benefit
student-athletes. Instead, the revenue upholds the institutions
and organizations where the student-athletes play.83 For example,
the average compensation for head football coaches at NCAA
public universities is more than $2 million annually, and the top
NCAA basketball coaches’ annual contracts now exceed $4 million
per year.84
Some argue that this allocation of funds is justified.85 The
basic argument is that student-athletes are “getting paid” through
free tuition, school assistance, and NCAA related benefits and,
therefore, they are not entitled to any additional payment.86 For
example, NCAA student-athletes sometimes receive a full-tuition
scholarship, room and board expenses, access to private, high-end
athletic facilities, team gear, and the foundation for an extremely
profitable professional career.87 Furthermore, the argument goes,
the NCAA is not exploiting or abusing the athletes, but rather

78
Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics [https://perma.cc/Z8EY-UXK7] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021).
79
Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
Where%20Does%20the%20Money%20GoWEB.PDF
[https://perma.cc/KHK2-6JU2]
(last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/
scholarships#:~:text=NCAA%20Divisions%20I%20and%20II,scholarships%20to%20c
ompete%20in%20college [https://perma.cc/X4N5-UASH] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
83
See Where Does the Money Go?, supra note 79.
84
Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/345D-B8KY].
85
Chrissy Clark, NCAA Players Already Get Paid. It’s Called Free Tuition, THE
FEDERALIST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/08/ncaa-playersalready-get-paid-its-called-free-tuition/ [https://perma.cc/V8GB-2E2R].
86
Id.
87
Id.
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providing them with a nurturing atmosphere where they have the
opportunity to pursue not only their athletic goals, but also
academic and social opportunities.88
D. Tuition is No Longer Enough
Although the argument made above may be appealing on the
surface, the argument fails to consider the reality and complexity
of being a student-athlete. The first stark reality is that the
majority of student-athletes do not receive full-tuition
scholarships and their aid covers only a portion of college-related
expenses.89 Additionally, a majority of student-athletes will not
have successful professional careers. There are more than 480,000
NCAA student-athletes and it is projected that less than two
percent will advance to a professional career in their sport.90 That
means roughly ninety-eight percent of student-athletes will not
have the opportunity to profit from their athletic ability past their
collegiate careers.91 This limited opportunity for student-athletes
to profit from their athletic ability is even more pronounced in
women’s sports. Even after Title IX went into effect, women’s
college athletic programs continue to have lower rates of
participation, staffing, financing, attendance, and support than
the male parallel.92 This trend is also apparent in women’s
professional sports.93 The unfortunate reality is that if a female
student-athlete does not have the ability to be compensated for her
athletic talents during her collegiate career—from those limited
opportunities that do present themselves—there is little to no
chance that she will do so as a professional athlete.94
Another factor to consider when determining whether
student-athletes are being fairly rewarded is whether the
academic opportunities these students receive actually translate
into a long-term educational benefit. First, there has been strong
88
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evidence of “academic clustering” of student-athletes into majors
without clear career paths.95 These studies have found that NCAA
student-athletes tend to cluster into the following majors:
“[G]eneral studies, interdisciplinary studies, social sciences such
as sociology, and humanities such as communications and
journalism.”96 Though the NCAA has advertised a considerable
rise in student-athletes’ graduation rates,97 the clustering of
student-athletes has serious, negative outcomes.98 For example,
student-athletes who have “little to no interest in their degree
programs and no real career trajectory other than sports are being
set up for failure once they leave college,” regardless of whether
they earn a college degree.99
Fath’ Carter, a former safety for the Oklahoma State football
team stated “[t]he philosophy, the main focus [of the program], was
to keep [the best players] eligible through any means
necessary . . . . The goal was not to educate but to get them the
passing grades they needed to keep playing. That’s the only thing
it was about.”100 Further, Peter Finley, a professor at Nova
Southeastern University who has conducted studies of clustering
in major college athletic programs, stated that student-athletes
“become a pawn . . . . They’re there to play the sport and major in
eligibility.”101 At the very least, these high performing—and
profitable—student-athletes are being heavily encouraged to take
an easier and more flexible academic path; at the worst, the vast
majority of these students are being forced to choose an academic
path that does not benefit them professionally, outside of a career
in sports, but instead maintains their ability to perform.
Moreover, the institutions that are supposed to help these
student-athletes thrive not only athletically, but also
academically, are in fact doing worse than encouraging “easy
95
Matthew B. Rowland, Academic Clustering of Student-Athletes: A Case Study
of Football and Basketball Programs (Aug. 2014) (M.A. thesis, University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville) (ScholarWorks@UARK).
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101
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majors”—they are actually participating in academic fraud.102 For
eighteen years, advisors directed student-athletes to enroll in fake
classes at the University of North Carolina (“UNC”) to maintain
their NCAA eligibility status.103
Mary Willingham, the
University’s learning specialist, stated that the “paper classes
were openly discussed as a way to keep athletes eligible to play.”104
Moreover, former UNC football player Michael McAdoo said “he
was forced into majoring in African American studies, the
department at the heart of the paper-classes scandal.”105
Crucially, the NCAA did not punish UNC or its athletic program
for this fraud.106 Unfortunately, “[t]he N.C.A.A.’s committee on
infractions concluded it lacked the power to punish the university
under the rules of the N.C.A.A.”107 Greg Sankey, who led the
infraction panel meeting, stated “[t]he N.C.A.A. defers to its
member schools to determine whether academic fraud
occurred.”108 This kind of systematic academic fraud is not unique
to UNC, as there have been countless instances of academic fraud
perpetrated by NCAA member schools to maintain star collegiate
athletes’ eligibility.109 The above mentioned examples tend to
show that the NCAA’s and its member institutions’ motto of
student first, athlete second is not a central pillar of their mission,
but really a sham that allows them to avoid paying extremely
talented individuals.
Yet another reason that the tuition and supplemental benefits
awarded to student-athletes is insufficient compensation is that
their scholarships are completely contingent on their athletic
performance.110 Student-athletes commonly sign a National
102
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Letter of Intent (“NLI”).111 The NLI is a binding agreement
between a PSA and the institution they will be attending.112 This
agreement guarantees the PSA tuition for one academic year in
return for the student-athlete’s full-time attendance and athletic
performance at the institution for one academic year.113 This is
often referred to as the “one-year rule,” and it is revisited annually
by the parties, which effectively allows colleges to renew, reduce,
or cancel student-athletes’ scholarships each year.114 This annual
renewal system means that the academic experience of studentathletes is completely unsecured. Additionally, according to the
National College Players Association, eighty-six percent of college
athletes live below the poverty line.115 Thus, the overwhelming
majority of these students do not have the means to stay in school
without their athletic scholarships.116 As a result, studentathletes are caught in a double bind: student-athletes are unable
to earn compensation if they participate in a NCAA program;
however, they may not have the opportunity to earn a college
degree if they do not participate in NCAA athletics.
E.

Student-Athletes are a Vulnerable Population

In addition to the flawed argument that student-athletes are
already being paid for their labor, there is another important point
that should be raised: student-athletes are a vulnerable
population. Student-athletes are a vulnerable population on
account of their age, race, and lack of choice and, therefore, need
more protection and support. The NCAA and member universities
are taking advantage of susceptible student-athletes under the
guise of their policy of cultivating amateurism.
Student-athletes are a vulnerable population because these
students are often minors or newly legal adults.117 A combination
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of the professional league age limits and NCAA bylaws result in
most collegiate athletes being rather young. The NCAA’s delayed
enrollment rule states that a PSA has a grace period, up to one
year, for the majority of Division I sports, after their high school
graduation to enroll in a collegiate institution.118 If the PSA does
not enroll at the first opportunity after the grace period begins,
and continues to participate in organized athletic competition,
they will lose a season of eligibility if they later seek to enroll.119
It is commonly understood that the “damage of assignments
of publicity rights is perhaps most apparent when children are
involved.”120 While student-athletes are not necessarily children,
they are young—often seventeen or eighteen years old—and
generally lack the life experience and skills to make decisions as
adults. Therefore, these student-athletes are not being protected
as children but are being exploited in a similar way.
Aside from concerns about age and inexperience, there is also
an undeniable nexus with race and poverty concerns. Recently,
the conversation about whether student-athletes should be paid
shifted to a conversation about race.121 As Senator Chris Murphy
observed, “a multi-billion dollar industry lines the pockets of
predominately white executives all while majority-Black athletes
can’t profit from their labor.”122 The issue of race in the
conversation surrounding the payment of college athletes gains a
lot of traction because Division I men’s basketball and football are
the financial backbone of Division I college athletics, and fifty-six
percent of Division I men’s basketball players and forty-eight
percent of Division I football players are African American.123 Dr.
Boyce Watkins, a finance professor at Syracuse University, has
Amateurism_Certification/Delayed_Enrollment_Webpage.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GCUMCWT] (last updated June 2020) (explaining there is no set age limit for any athletes,
however, Division I athletes are required to enroll in school one calendar year after high
school graduation and then have just five years to complete a typical four-year degree,
making student-athletes a young population).
118
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119
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120
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remarked that the NCAA system disproportionately hurts lowincome areas and the African-American community.124 Dale
Brown, former LSU basketball coach, put it starkly: “Look at the
money we make off predominantly poor [B]lack kids . . . . We’re
the whoremasters.”125
Finally, student-athletes are a vulnerable population because
they have little to no choice due to the limited options they have
upon graduating high school. The major American professional
sports leagues, including the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”) and the National Football League (“NFL”), have age
limits for participants.126 Specifically, the NBA requires athletes
to be at least nineteen years old to enter the draft, and the NFL
requires athletes to be at least three years removed from high
school—usually twenty or twenty-one years old.127 These age
restrictions leave prospective professional athletes with limited
options including playing at the collegiate level, playing
overseas,128 or playing in an alternative professional league.129
However, the alternatives to the NCAA do not have the same
prestige130 and are limited to the most elite players.131
Therefore, for those who have hopes of becoming professional
athletes, the tried-and-true path requires NCAA participation and
adherence to the NCAA bylaws, which require student-athletes to
not utilize their publicity rights while contemporaneously allowing
the NCAA to exploit their publicity rights. These aspiring studentathletes simply do not have the same “leverage to negotiate fair,
or even favorable, contract terms related to the use of their

124
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identities” that successful professional athletes have at their
disposal.132 Thus, student-athletes “will continue to be burdened
by oppressive, broad, long-term (even perpetual) assignments”
unless more effective steps are taken to protect their rights.133
III. INSUFFICIENT SOLUTIONS UP UNTIL NOW
The exploitation of student-athletes’ publicity rights is not a
new conversation.134 In fact, numerous courts have already
addressed NCAA amateurism rules and the exploitation of
student-athletes’ publicity rights resulting in no positive
change.135 More recently, state legislatures have decided to
address the problem by creating legislation that requires the
NCAA and higher education institutions to allow student-athletes
to receive compensation from third parties for the use of their
NIL.136 Although this was a positive step forward, I argue that it
is incompatible, insufficient, and unfair when applied to a national
organization like the NCAA. Additionally, due to the pressure
that these state bills placed on the NCAA, it implemented bylaw
changes. However, these bylaw changes are temporary and do not
provide student-athletes the full benefit of their NILs. Finally,
any federal legislation created will preempt all of the work these
individual states have done to help student-athletes. Therefore,
unless the federal legislation is crafted with these students in
mind, the exploitation will persist.
A.

Prior Case Law has Inadequately Protected Student-Athletes

In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the rules
governing the broadcast of college football games.137 The Court
held that a per se rule against the NCAA’s amateurism rules

132
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would be inappropriate because “[i]n order to preserve the
character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like.”138 The Court
reasoned that the NCAA must be allowed to restrict member
institutions because the national system’s effectiveness would be
destroyed if member institutions adopted decisions unilaterally.139
In this way, the NCAA amateurism model was bolstered by
approval from the Supreme Court of the United States.140
More recently, in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, a group of current and former college football and
basketball players brought an antitrust class action suit against
the NCAA.141 These former and current student-athletes alleged
Sherman Act violations against the NCAA for restraining trade in
relation to the use of players’ names, images, and likenesses in an
Electronic Arts (“EA”) video game.142 The Ninth Circuit decision
in O’Bannon supports the notion that amateurism is a legitimate
purpose for the NCAA to maintain competitiveness.143 The court
also found—absent the NCAA’s anti-compensation rules—video
game makers would likely have paid the plaintiffs for the right to
use their NILs, and thus the plaintiffs had suffered an injury.144
However, due to the NCAA amateurism rules EA did not pay the
plaintiffs, but instead had a licensing agreement with the NCAA
through the Collegiate Licensing Company.145
Unfortunately, the holding in this case was extremely narrow
and once again did nothing to improve the position of studentathletes, stating “we reaffirm that NCAA regulations are subject
to antitrust scrutiny . . . . The Rule of Reason requires that the
NCAA permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to
their student athletes. It does not require more.”146 Although
O’Bannon shed light on an interesting problem, there were little
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to no real-life consequences for student-athletes because EA never
produced another NCAA-inspired video game again.147
Even more recently, in National College Athletic Association
v. Alston, a group of current and former collegiate football and
basketball players brought an action alleging that the NCAA
violated federal antitrust law by limiting the compensation they
could receive in exchange for their athletic services.148 Unlike the
O’Bannon plaintiffs, the student-athletes in this case challenged,
among other things, limits on non-cash, education-related
benefits.149 The Ninth Circuit found no “concrete procompetitive
effect of limiting non-cash, education-related benefits.”150
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and found that the NCAA
cannot prohibit its member schools from providing athletes with
certain forms of education-related benefits.151 This decision was a
huge win in the fight to fairly compensate NCAA student-athletes.
However, it was connected to education-related benefits and did
not address the issue of compensation from third parties for the
use of the student-athletes’ NIL.
B.

The Varying State Legislation is Inapplicable for a National
Organization

Besides the numerous examples of unsatisfying litigation,
state legislatures have also attempted to address this issue, but
unfortunately these solutions will likely fall short of solving the
problem. In recent years there has been a growing discomfort
among the public with the NCAA and other organizations that
make billions of dollars off of the labor of unpaid, mostly young,
Black, male, athletes.152 Therefore, in response to the public
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outcry, many state legislatures have proposed or are proposing
bills to address this issue.153
On September 30, 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom of
California signed the “Fair Pay to Play Act” into law.154 This law
prohibits California postsecondary educational institutions and
every organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics
from preventing a student-athlete from earning compensation as
a result of the use of their name, image, or likeness or obtaining
professional representation relating to their participation in
intercollegiate athletics.155
The California law created a ripple effect causing other states
to propose and even pass new legislation addressing the
compensation of NCAA athletes for their publicity rights. For
example, on June 12, 2020, Florida Governor Rick DeSantis signed
into law the Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation and Rights
Bill,156 which is similar to California’s law except that Florida’s law
is effective as of July 2021.157 Therefore, as of the summer of 2021,
Florida universities began playing by a different set of rules than
all other NCAA member institutions residing in other states. To
date, Florida and California are joined by approximately two dozen
other states with similar bills in the legislative process, but much
remains in flux.158
Although these state laws are moving in the right direction,
they will likely be an insufficient solution because a state-by-state
approach cannot be effectively implemented against a national
organization such as the NCAA. As noted above, the NCAA is a
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national organization that spans across all fifty states.159 Thus,
the varying state laws treat student-athletes in similar positions
differently due to their geographical location—an approach that is
untenable for the NCAA.160 Therefore, the NCAA is encouraging
states not to create state level changes and attempting to back
federal legislation to preempt the varying state laws.161 As Ramogi
Huma, the executive director of the National College Players
Association, stated, “[t]hey’re trying to tell the states to hold on
and wait for us, meanwhile they’re going to Congress trying to get
legislation to preempt the states in the ways the NCAA would
like.”162 Although state legislation is a possible solution, it is an
inadequate and unstable solution, as it will not protect all studentathletes and it may well be preempted by federal legislation.163
C.

NCAA’s Bylaw Reforms are Insufficient

Due to the media attention surrounding the California Fair
Pay to Play Act,164 the NCAA was pressured to respond.165 On
June 30, 2021, the NCAA announced a uniform interim policy
suspending NCAA name, image, and likeness rules for all
incoming and current student-athletes in all sports.166 NCAA
President Mark Emmert stated that this policy was adopted due
to the variety of state laws and that the NCAA intends to “continue
to work with Congress to develop a solution that will provide
clarity on a national level.”167 He goes on to explain that “[t]he
current environment . . . prevents us from providing a more

159
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permanent solution.”168 The interim policy allows student-athletes
to participate in NIL activities without violating NCAA rules.169
While these recent developments are a huge win for studentathletes and may even suggest that the issue has been resolved,
the struggle for student-athletes to use and be compensated for
their NILs will likely persist. First, the NCAA’s NIL rule
modifications are only temporary.170 For example, the current
NCAA reforms allow schools and universities to restrict studentathletes from using their school’s logos, facilities, and uniforms in
any of their NIL deals, nor will they allow student-athletes to
engage in business deals for certain prohibited products and
services.171 Additionally, student-athletes can be restricted from
using content that represents the team or university and that
occurs in “team-mandated activities.”172
This is a critical
limitation on the bylaw changes because a student-athlete’s
position as a successful NCAA athlete is frequently how and why
their NIL is commercially valuable.173
Second, all future state and federal laws, which are currently
being proposed, will preempt the NCAA bylaw modifications.
Although the state laws currently being proposed seem to be
leaning in favor of protecting student-athletes,174 they too will be
preempted by any federal legislation.175 To that end, NCAA
President Mark Emmert and other NCAA officials are lobbying
congressional “lawmakers to create federal NIL legislation to
supersede mounting state laws that threaten the organization’s
long-standing amateurism model.”176 This action by the NCAA’s
President demonstrates that with one hand the NCAA is
supporting the legal and social progress of student-athletes, but
with the other hand the NCAA is attempting to uphold the system
that has exploited them for decades.
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D. Federal Legislation: Two Parties Two Different Goals
Finally, there has been a lot of discussion about creating a
federal right of publicity. Senator Roger Wicker, Chairman of the
Senate Commerce Committee, stated that he believes that a
federal NIL bill is imperative to address the conflicting and
varying compensation laws of the different states and that a bill
will likely arrive on the floor of the U.S. Senate after the 2020
presidential election.177 This issue has received media attention
mostly due to its connection to, and implications for, the NCAA.
In particular, on August 13, 2020, a group of senators announced
a proposal for “a college athletes bill of rights.”178 If enacted, this
legislation would allow college athletes to market their NIL and
exploit their own publicity rights with minimal restrictions.179
Although the NCAA has advocated for a federal right of
publicity, the NCAA’s intent in creating a federal right is different
than the student-athletes’ goals.180 The NCAA is urging Congress
to create a federal bill since the new state bills conflict with their
needs as a national organization.181 The federal law the NCAA is
lobbying Congress to pass “[e]nsures federal preemption over state
NIL laws; [p]rotects the NCAA from federal and state antitrust
lawsuits targeting the NIL rules; [s]afeguards the nonemployment
status of student-athletes; [m]aintains the distinction between
college athletes and professional athletes; and [u]pholds the
NCAA’s values.”182 In other words, the NCAA’s intent in
supporting a federal right of publicity law is to maintain the status
quo, not to advance student-athletes’ rights.
E.

The Lanham Act is an Inadequate Substitute

Although there is no federal right of publicity at present,
federal trademark law has been used in the past to protect
177
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individuals’ publicity rights from unauthorized commercial use
constituting false endorsement.183 However, the federal trademark
statute cannot adequately fill the void of a lack of a federal right
of publicity. As Professor McCarthy explains, the “Lanham Act §
43(a) cannot provide a federal vehicle for the assertion of
infringement of the state law right of publicity for the simple
reason that § 43(a) is limited to some form of falsity, while
infringement of the right of publicity involves no element of
falsity.”184 Therefore, the elements of falsity or likelihood of
confusion in trademark law are not required to prove infringement
of the right of publicity.185 Additionally, the protection offered
under federal trademark law extends only to “famous mark[s].”186
As such, the Lanham Act would only work to protect celebrities,
and the right of publicity should not be a special right exclusively
for the famous and should be available for everyone.187 Since the
federal trademark law cannot adequately fill this void, it is vital
for Congress to finally pass a federal right of publicity statute.
IV. THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOLUTION: FEDERAL RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A.

A Federal Right of Publicity

The most appropriate and the only adequate form of
protection for vulnerable and exploited populations, like NCAA
student-athletes, is a federal right of publicity. A federal right of
publicity must be created to provide individuals with uniformity,
equal protection under the law, and to prevent the loss of control
over one’s fundamental rights. Most importantly, a new federal
right of publicity, unlike the intent behind the original
development of the right of publicity,188 should put the protection
of the person before the economic needs of businesses.
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The new federal right of publicity statute must preempt
statutory and common law state laws on the subject to ensure
uniformity.189 The current state-by-state approach provides
individuals with inconsistent protections or no protection at all.190
Therefore, the state-based system of the right of publicity has
failed student-athletes who are a part of a national organization
with member universities in all fifty states.191 A foundational
principle of American jurisprudence is predictability and
certainty, and the current patchwork of publicity rights directly
contradicts those values.192
A new federal right of publicity statute should also apply
equally to every individual, regardless of whether or not they are
a celebrity. A majority of states have already taken this position
and, therefore, the federal statute should adopt this position as
well.193 The Ninth Circuit explained the majority’s rational by
holding that the right of publicity protects not only the celebrity’s
identity, but also the celebrity’s non-famous birthname.194 There
does not need to be a particular number of people who actually
identify the individual in a right of publicity infringement, instead
that number is relevant only when determining the remedy.195 As
a majority of states have decreed, “fame should not be a
prerequisite” to be able to recover for a right of publicity
violation.196 Incorporating this concept into the federal right of
publicity will ensure the protection of both student-athletes who
are known nationally and student-athletes who are not in the
spotlight.
Additionally, the federal right of publicity statute should
incorporate limitations on the alienation of the right. While most
property is alienable, we as a society have recognized that in
certain situations restrictions should be placed on the alienation
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of property.197
For example, many have argued that the
alienability of fundamental rights should be restrained.198
However, there has been less contemplation of whether the right
of publicity should be alienable and under what circumstances.
Professor Rothman argued that the right of publicity could be
viewed as a fundamental right itself and thus inalienable.199 Or,
alternatively, that the right of publicity is so interwoven with
other fundamental rights such as, liberty, free speech, and
freedom of association, and thus should be inalienable.200 The
restriction on alienating fundamental rights can been justified as
paternalistic, freedom-enhancing, and reducing societal harms.201
As seen with the NCAA student-athletes, the NCAA has enormous
control over the student-athletes’ publicity rights even without a
technical transfer.202 Therefore, the new federal statute should
handle the right of publicity like other fundamental rights and
limit its alienability.
B.

University NIL Programs

In addition to the creation of a federal right of publicity,
universities can—and should—implement educational NIL
programs to ensure that student-athletes are adequately prepared
and protected from the exploitation of their own publicity rights.
For example, St. John’s University Department of Athletics has
launched the Unlimited Program.203 This program is a joint
partnership with the Department of Athletics, The Peter J. Tobin
College of Business, and The Lesley H. and William L. Collins
College of Professional Studies, created with the goal of ensuring
that student-athletes have the tools necessary to succeed in
controlling their NIL rights.204 All NCAA member institutions
should implement similar NIL education programs to ensure
197
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student-athletes are prepared to handle the new opportunities
coming their way.
CONCLUSION
The issue of alienability of the right of publicity is extremely
troubling in the context of young NCAA athletes, like Donald De
La Haye, but the problem extends even further. This issue also
impacts professional athletes, aspiring musicians, models, reality
television show contestants, and actors—all of whom are
frequently required to sign away their publicity rights in gross, in
perpetuity.205
In conclusion, a federal right of publicity is needed. The
federal right of publicity should aim to provide uniformity, apply
equally to all, and limit alienability in certain situations. In a
modern, interconnected world where national organizations,
campaigns, and advertisements are more common, a uniform
approach is crucial. Most importantly, the federal statute must
focus on the needs of the individual identity-holder instead of the
commercial needs of the publicity-holder. Further, the dangers
associated with the alienation of the right of publicity are clearly
shown through the case study of the exploitation of young NCAA
student-athletes. Therefore, the federal statute should allow for
the alienation of the right of publicity to be restricted in certain
situations similar to that of other fundamental rights.
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